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Over the past four to ￿ve decades, fundamental changes have taken place in the
nature of the family and the structure of family relationships.1 These re￿ ect
complex interactions among changes in divorce laws, increasing female labour
force participation, innovations in the technology of contraception and changes
in social attitudes and norms. This paper is intended to contribute to the
economic analysis of these phenomena by constructing a model of a couple-based
household which chooses marriage vs cohabitation, its fertility, and whether to
continue the relationship or to separate, in the context of given labour market
conditions and a set of legal rules regulating post-separation outcomes.
Also over the past four to ￿ve decades there has been substantial develop-
ment in the economic modelling of the household, and a large theoretical and
empirical literature now exists dealing with issues such as marriage, fertility and
divorce. A large part of this literature is based on the assumption that family
members act cooperatively and necessarily achieve Pareto e¢ cient allocations.2
For example, the Nash bargaining models of household behavior originating
with Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) assume that
household allocations are Pareto e¢ cient and can somehow be enforced as bind-
ing agreements even in a one-shot game. Early challenges to this assumption
were made by Ulph (1988), Woolley (1988) and, within the Nash bargaining
framework, by Ott (1992), Konrad and Lommerud (1995), and Lundberg and
Pollak (2003), among others. Applying non-cooperative game theory to house-
hold decision making in a static environment, they identify sources of ine¢ cient
behavior of household members.
In this paper, instead of assuming either cooperative or non-cooperative be-
havior, we derive conditions for cooperation in a dynamic setting where players
are solely driven by their self-interest and are not able to write exogenously en-
forceable agreements. Thus, the present paper directly relates to the theory of
relational contracts, which we believe provides an appropriate tool to gain new
insights into decision-making within households, especially when this involves
intertemporal choices. Relational contracts are dynamic games based on actions
or outcomes that are observable but not veri￿able, i.e., the associated contracts
are not legally enforceable. As agreements in household relationships are to a
large extent implicit and extend over quite long periods of time, they present
a good subject for an analysis with a relational contracts model. Starting with
Bull (1987), relational contracts were initially developed to analyze labour mar-
kets and agency situations. MacLeod/Malcomson (1989) provide a complete
analysis for perfect information, while Levin (2003) explores the case of imper-
fect public monitoring. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) and Schmidt and
Schnitzer (1995) study the interaction between relational and formal contracts.
This relates to the model in this paper since after a divorce, implicit agreements
1For extensive documentation and discussion of these changes see in particular the two
Symposia on, respectively, Household Economics in the Journal of Economic Perspectives,
2007, 21(2), and Investment in Children in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2008, 22(3).
2See Apps and Rees (2009), Chapters 3,4 for an extensive survey and list of references.
2between partners are typically replaced by formal legal arrangements that regu-
late such issues as wealth division, child custody, and access of the non-custodial
parent to his children. Most closely related to the present analysis is the paper
by Matouschek and Rasul (2008). They develop a model where ongoing cooper-
ation within the household creates an exogenously given bene￿t and has to be
enforced by threats of punishment for deviations. Divorce costs serve as a com-
mitment device and thus increase the ability to generate utility by cooperation.
Our model extends this approach and applies it to an analysis of a richer set of
phenomena, in particular the fertility decision.
The underlying model consists of two risk-neutral players, the primary and
the second earner (referred to as he and she respectively3), who form a ￿poten-
tially ￿long-lasting relationship. They ￿rst decide whether to marry or cohabit
and then how many children they want to have. When children are present, the
second earner reduces her market labour supply. This causes current income
losses as well as a reduced accumulation of human capital, thus inducing lower
future wages. In later periods, the couple decides whether to remain together
or to separate. Remaining together is e¢ cient if the sum of players￿payo⁄ lev-
els within the relationship is higher than outside. Reallocations of resources
may be needed to maintain an e¢ cient marriage. One partner might prefer a
separation, while the other might want to stay together. Then, the former has
to be su¢ ciently compensated. Such a transfer might or might not always be
enforceable, depending on the underlying assumptions concerning the timing of
payments. We analyze both cases, namely that the couple only breaks up if it
is e¢ cient, and the situation where ine¢ cient separations can occur.
It is not however possible to make a formally binding commitment to a
certain contingent allocation of the utility surplus arising from the relationship
ex ante. Therefore, all related promises have to be self-enforcing and part of
equilibrium strategies.4 Cooperative behavior is only individually rational if
reneging is followed by su¢ cient and credible punishment. A separation as
punishment must be credible in the sense that it has be optimal for a player to
actually terminate the relationship.
After identifying the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium, we analyze the situation
following a divorce in more detail. While agreements during a relationship
are to a large extent implicit, this changes after a divorce. When all goodwill
is lost, issues like ￿nancial support or access to children are mainly governed
by law. Thus, we take an institutional perspective and analyze the impact of
di⁄erent policy changes on fertility, marriage stability, and the propensity to get
married versus cohabiting. In doing so, we want to contribute to the discussion
concerning low birth rates in many countries. We argue that in addition to
issues that deal with the increased opportunity costs of children mentioned
earlier, a shift in the enforceability of transfers induced by legal changes can be
an important factor determining fertility levels.
3The pronouns re￿ect the fact that 70-90% of second earners in North America and Europe
are female. See Immervoll et al., 2009, Table 1, for country-speci￿c numbers.
4Although bargining models might implicitly assume a dynamic setting to support e¢ cient
decisions, they do not make precise the conditions necessary for cooperation.
3A major part of this analysis deals with divorce costs. Our model predicts
that divorce costs may in general have a positive impact on fertility by increas-
ing relationship stability and decreasing players￿ reservation utilities. Thus,
a marriage can serve as a commitment device to enforce cooperation within
a relationship. This idea has already been discussed by Becker (1991) and
Rawthorn (1999), was more formally derived by Matouschek and Rasul (2008),
and empirically tested by various authors (see Rasul, (2003), Stevenson, (2007),
Matouschek and Rasul, (2008), and Bellido and MarcØn, (2011)).However, if
divorce costs reduce the credibility of an o⁄-equilibrium divorce threat too far
might they create adverse e⁄ects, so that higher divorce costs do not necessarily
increase welfare in our model. Making a divorce more di¢ cult induces couples
to stay together when their match quality has become relatively bad and they
would prefer to break up, absent divorce costs. If the gains from increased com-
mitment are lower than this welfare loss, a couple might not get married but
instead choose to cohabit (where separation costs are substantially lower), and
in this way higher divorce costs might ultimately decrease fertility.
The result of the model,to the e⁄ect that total welfare might not necessarily
increase with higher divorce costs, is in line with the empirical results presented
by Alesina and Giuliano (2007) who, in contrast to Rasul (2003) and Matouschek
and Rasul (2008), ￿nd that unilateral divorce, which is taken to imply a fall in
divorce costs, does not imply a decrease but rather an increase in the number
of marriages. Concerning the impact on fertility, Alesina and Guiliano (2007)
also ￿nd that in-wedlock fertility basically remains una⁄ected by the adoption
of unilateral divorce laws, while out-of-wedlock fertility decreases signi￿cantly
and fertility rates for newly married couples go up. This supports our view that
the impact of divorce costs on marriage and fertility overall is not as obvious
as it might seem, since our model is rich enough to capture more aspects of the
interaction than just an increased degree of commitment.
In addition to divorce costs, we analyze the impact of wealth division rules,
in the form of post-separation monetary payments solely based on income dif-
ferences. Although having no (direct) impact on relationship stability, they can
help to increase fertility. Since raising children is typically associated with a
decrease in future income for one spouse, such payments can serve as an insur-
ance against the human capital loss that results from taking time out for child
care. Both e⁄ects together ￿no direct impact on relationship stability in equi-
librium combined with an increased slackness of the enforceability constraint ￿
increase the relative bene￿ts of being married compared to cohabiting for higher
post-separation payments.
Finally, we model the e⁄ects of a reduction of the primary earner￿ s access
to his children following a separation. By fostering marriage stability, reduc-
ing reservation utility and therefore increasing the punishment following non-
cooperation, such a restriction can also help to increase fertility. It does imply
however that an unintended consequence of increases in post-separation access
of primary earners, though increasing the utility of both them and their children,
may be an increase in the divorce rate and lower fertility.
42 The Model
Two individuals decide whether to form a household and, if so, whether to
marry or cohabit. In each case a household consists of a primary and a second
earner, denoted i = 1;2. The time horizon is in￿nite5, t = 0;1;2;:::, and players
discount the future with the factor ￿ 2 (0;1).
In the ￿rst period of the game, i.e., in t = 0, the couple chooses to have
n ￿ 0 children. For convenience, we assume n is a real number. This requires
the second earner to devote g(n) of her total time allocation (normalized to 1)
to raising children in t = 0, with g(0) = 0; g0 > 0, g00 ￿ 0 and g(n) ￿ 1. In this
period therefore she earns (1 ￿ g(n))w20, where w20 is her wage in period t = 0.
In all future periods, the second earner supplies her total time allocation to
the labour market, earning w2t(n) ￿ 0. Because of work-related human capital
acquisition, the wage is an increasing concave function of her period 0 labor
supply and therefore a decreasing convex function of fertility, i.e., w0
2t < 0 and
w00
2t ￿ 0:6 It is assumed that human capital accumulation only occurs in the ￿rst
period7, and the wage w2t(n) ￿ w2(n) is constant for t ￿ 1.
The primary earner works full time in every period and earns w1t in period
t. As his human capital accumulation is of no interest to our analysis, w1t is
constant over time and equals w1. Furthermore, we assume that w1 > w2(n) ￿
w20.
Per period utility functions if the household is formed are uit = xit +’i(n),
with ’i(0) = 0, ’0
i > 0 and ’00
i < 0 for i = 1;2; where x is a private consumption
good. The individual consumptions are de￿ned by:
x1t = w1 ￿ pt t = 0;1;::: (1)
x20 = w20[1 ￿ g(n)] + p0 (2)
x2t = w2(n) + pt t = 1;2;::: (3)
where pt T 0 is a payment made from one partner to the other. If pt > 0, the
primary earner makes the payment.
The payment pt need not be explicit, its value is implied by any choice of n
and the xit; given w1;w20 and w2(n): For analytical purposes however it is useful
to treat this as if it were an explicit payment. On the other hand, no explicit
contract on the pt is feasible, it has to be part of an equilibrium supported by
the household relational contract (HRC), de￿ned below.
In periods t = 1;2;:::, the couple makes the decision whether to separate or
remain together. A separation has the following consequences:
￿ Each receives an exogenously given outside net utility ~ vi; a random vari-
able, in every period, which re￿ ects possibilities outside the relationship,
5Although not factually correct, this assumption can be rationalised by assuming individ-
uals do not know for sure when the last periods of their lives will be.
6The reduced wage can also re￿ect di¢ culties in re-entering the labor market after being
out of it for some time. Future non-participation can be handled by assuming w2t = 0:
7This assumption has no qualitative impact on our results.
5such as potential new partners, as well as those within, like love or caring
for the existing partner. The common assumption that the couple receives
utility just by being together is captured by making the values of these
outside utilities net of any internal "relationship utilities". These outside
utilities determine the "match quality" of the couple in a given period,
as the di⁄erence between the sums of achieved and outside utilities. The
value ~ vi is drawn independently in each period from a distribution Fi(~ vi)
with continuous density fi(~ vi), strictly positive everywhere on the sup-
port [v0
i ;v1
i ]. Thus the ~ vi are independently and identically distributed
over time. Furthermore, we assume v0
i ￿ 0 < v1
i and denote the un-
conditional expectation E[~ vi] ￿ vi. For now, we do not impose further
restrictions on the distributions. We will implicitly do so later in order to
have second order conditions satis￿ed. We also assume that both outside
utility realizations, v1 and v2, are observed by each partner.8 If a player
breaks a promise (what this means will be made precise below), the gen-
eral quality of living together can be negatively a⁄ected. Thus, following
a deviation, the non-reneging partner i￿ s outside utility is increased by the
amount ￿vi ￿ 0 in every subsequent period.
￿ The utility derived from children by the primary earner after a separation
is ￿’1(n), ￿ 2 [0;1]. Here, we want to allow for di⁄erences in legislation
determining the access of the primary earner to his children, given the
assumption that custody is granted to the second earner,9 and this is
captured in a simple way by ￿.
If the couple had chosen to marry, as opposed to cohabiting, a separation is
a divorce and has two further e⁄ects:
￿ The partners bear possibly unequal divorce costs ki > 0.
￿ The second earner receives a monetary transfer ￿fw1t ￿ w2t(n)g from
1. We will refer to this transfer as a wealth division rule or alimony
payment. Since we only consider agents who are risk neutral and saving is
not considered explicitly, both terms mean the same thing in our setting.
Although the transfer does not directly depend on the number of children,
n enters via its impact on 2￿ s wage. The factor ￿ is assumed to be known
ex ante and is determined by divorce law. Note that we are assuming that
this law takes into account the e⁄ects of the second earner￿ s withdrawal
from the labour market on her human capital, in assessing the value of
the payment. Then, ￿ measures the weight given to this e⁄ect.
8The assumption that spouses know their partners￿outside option fairly well is supported
by Peters (1986)
9Note, we do not take account of any perceived disutility to the children arising from
divorce. This could be treated as a factor, say ￿i 2 (0;1]; applied to both utilities. Nothing
in the following discussion would change qualitatively as a result, as long as the value of ￿ for
the second earner was not so much smaller than that for the primary earner as to outweigh
the e⁄ects of ￿ as analyzed here.
6The values for ki, ￿ and ￿ remain constant over time. The separation decision
is irreversible, so that a couple never gets together again. After a separation, no
further voluntary transfers are made. We assume that then, all trust between
(former) partners is lost, implying that transfers can no longer be self enforcing
(i.e., part of an equilibrium ￿this is further speci￿ed below).
As a result of these assumptions, the partners￿separation utilities in periods
















We denote the expectation of separation utilities E[~ Ui(~ vi)] = ~ U1(vi) by ￿ Ui.
If the partners are not married, we simply set ki = ￿ = 0: Thus we model
cohabitation as essentially the decision to avoid divorce costs and dispense with
legal regulation of wealth division payments. We discuss the question of child
custody/access arrangements in section 8.10
To complete the model we specify the timing of events within one period. At
the beginning of t = 0, the couple decides between marriage or cohabitation.11
The spouses must both agree to whichever choice they make.12 Then, they
unanimously decide on n, the number of children. The primary earner then
works full-time, while the second earner allocates her time between work and
raising children, as speci￿ed above. After players receive their income, a transfer
p0 is made.
At the beginning of each subsequent period, if the couple is still together
both observe the realizations of this period￿ s outside utilities, v1t and v2t. Tak-
ing these into account, the spouses then decide whether to remain together or
not. If they separate, they receive their separation utilities ~ Ui. Otherwise, both
work and receive their income, followed by the transfer pt. We do not impose
any exogenous bound on the transfer levels. This implicitly assumes that play-
ers can save or borrow.
Note that we abstract from consumption costs of children. If we included
such costs and assumed a given allocation among partners, our results would
not be a⁄ected qualitatively. The same would be true for laws providing for
￿nancially support to a parent who has custody of the children post-separation
to cover child costs. Furthermore, our wealth division rules do not take the
utility of children into account and are only supposed to compensate the second
earner for her human capital loss. Thus, we do not consider child support laws.
10We ignore possible costs or utility of the act of getting married in itself.
11The matching process is taken as exogenously given.
12In contrast, we assume below that separation/divoce decisions can be made unilaterally.
7These are beyond the scope of our analysis, especially as one problem associated
with them is that fathers often do not pay despite the existence of a legal title
(see Allen and Brinig, 2010).
Our assumptions with regard to g(n), the time needed for child care, and the
fact that only the second earner participates in this, require some discussion. If
non-parental child-care facilities were available, g(n) and the associated human
capital loss could be reduced. However, this would not a⁄ect our results, as
long as a substantial amount of parental time still has to be spent. Realistically
of course both parents engage in child care, but as long as their input levels
are substantially di⁄erent, as appears to be generally the case, our qualitative
results go through.
3 Household Relational Contracts
3.1 The game: formal characterization
Players have to decide on whether to form a household, and if they do so the legal
form of their relationship, the number of children they want to have, payments
pt; and, in later periods, whether they separate or stay together. We assume that
while together they formulate a household relational contract (HRC), which is
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and speci￿es all actions players will
take conditional on all possible histories. However, this cannot be a legally bind-
ing contract contingent on actions or outcomes, because of the non-veri￿ability
of the payments pt.13
We brie￿ y give a formal characterization of actions, strategies and conditions
for a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., an HRC. Instead of just referring to the
net transfer pt, we split it into the individual contributions of players 1 and 2,
with pt = p1t +p2t, where p1t ￿ 0 and p2t ￿ 0. Obviously, only the net transfer
pt is relevant and thus used in all other sections. However, splitting it into two
components simpli￿es a characterization of strategies.
The number of children is determined as follows. Each player announces
their preferred fertility level ni, i = 1;2. Since this decision has to be made
unanimously, we assume for convenience that realized fertility14 n is the smaller
of both players￿announcements if they di⁄er, i.e., n = minfn1;n2g.
Players also announce dit 2 f0;1g, where dit = 1 indicates that player i
wants to remain together for period t. If at least one of them chooses dit = 0,
they irrevocably break up.15 The variable dt 2 f0;1g indicates whether the
relationship is still active in period t. It is de￿ned recursively by dt = dt￿1d1td2t,
with d0 = 1.
13This is supported by the argument that individual consumptions within a household
cannot be veri￿ably measured. In reality of course there is a far richer set of reasons for the
impossibility of complete marital contracts than this.
14Which, we assume, is non-stochastic.
15We thus assume a unilateral divorce regime.
8Finally, each player announces a value mi 2 f0;1g. mi = 1 indicates that
player i wants to get married, whereas mi = 0 implies that the player prefers
to cohabit. The spouses marry if and only if both agree, i.e., if m ￿ m1m2 = 1.
Otherwise, the couple cohabits.
Then, the history ht speci￿es all events that occur at time t. For t = 0,
we have h0 = fm1;m2;n1;n2;d10;d20;p10;p20g (note that d10 = d20 = d0 = 1
by assumption). For all t ￿ 1, the history is ht = fd1t;d2t;p1t;p2tg. Then,
ht = fh￿g
t￿1
￿=0 is the history path at the beginning of period t, with h0 = ;.
Ht = fhtg characterizes the set of history paths up to time t, while H = [tHt
is the set of all possible histories.
A strategy ￿i for player i, i = 1;2, is a sequence of functions Mi [ Ni [
fPit;Ditg1
t=0, where Mi : H0 ! f0;1g speci￿es whether the couple gets married
(if m = m1m2 = 1) or cohabits (m = 0). Ni : H0 [ fm1;m2g ! [0;1)
describes the process determining fertility at the beginning of period t = 0, and
n = minfn1;n2g is the realized fertility level. Dit : Ht [ fv1t;v2tg ! f0;1g,
t ￿ 1, characterizes players￿decisions on whether they want to remain together
(dit = 1) or separate, with dt = dt￿1d1;td2;t and d0 = 1. Finally, transfers
are determined by P1;t : Ht [ fv1t;v2t;d1t;d2tg ! [0;1) and P2;t : Ht [
fv1t;v2t;d1t;d2tg ! (￿1;0] for periods t ￿ 1. In t = 0, the functions are P1;0 :
H0 [ fm1;m2;n1;n2g ! [0;1) and P2;0 : H0 [ fm1;m2;n1;n2g ! (￿1;0].
Denoting a player￿ s payo⁄s following history ht by Ui(￿1;￿2 j ht), a strategy




U1(~ ￿1;￿2 j ht)
￿2 2 argmax
~ ￿2
U1(￿1; ~ ￿2 j ht)
3.2 Fertility, Transfers, and Constraints
The spouses will use the payments pt as an incentive to either raise fertility or
maintain the relationship.16 This increases e¢ ciency as absent any transfers
chosen fertility, as the minimum of the individual optima, would be lower and
separation probabilities higher, since separation could take place even when the
sum of utilities is greater with the relationship than without. Note that we
refer to e¢ ciency as the outcome players would choose if they were able to fully
commit.
Too low fertility is induced by the exogenously given distribution of the costs
and bene￿ts of having children, i.e., the fact that the second earner loses human
capital when she takes time to raise them in period t = 0. Thus it is very
likely that the individually optimal levels of n di⁄er between spouses. Then,
gains from cooperation exist which the partners can try to exploit. The partner
bearing relatively higher costs (in relation to the bene￿ts) might be willing
to agree on having more children than individually optimal if compensation is
(credibly) promised.
16Transfers can always contain a purely redistributive component as well.
9Ine¢ cient separation has to be prevented if staying together is e¢ cient, i.e,
outside utility realizations (v1;v2) in a period are low enough that the sum of
utility streams when remaining together is higher than
P
i ~ U(vi), but one player
would ￿nd it individually optimal to split. Then, a transfer exists that makes
it optimal for both to remain together.
However, transfers to increase e¢ ciency by giving incentives to raise fertility
and prevent ine¢ cient divorce must be self-enforcing, i.e., part of a subgame
perfect equilibrium as speci￿ed above. For example, assume a transfer is sup-
posed to be positive. Then, it must be in the interest of the primary earner
to actually make it ex post, i.e., after the second earner has kept her promise,
either to accept a higher fertility level or abstain from inducing a separation.
Thus, although he might be willing to make that transfer ex ante, the limits
of commitment in the absence of explicit contingent contracts might make him
break this promise ex post. As this is anticipated by the second earner, her
ex-ante willingness to cooperate would be limited by his credibility.
More precisely, a transfer will only be made if reneging triggers su¢ cient
punishment. We use the standard dynamic games/relational contracts ap-
proach17 and assume that after someone has reneged, the relationship has be-
come strained, and any trust between the partners is lost. Thus, the harshest
possible punishment is used (Abreu, 1986), implying that the equilibrium with
the lowest payo⁄ for the player that reneged (pushing that player down to their
reservation utility) is played. As the only decision players can make in periods
t ￿ 1 determines whether they want to remain together, punishment here must
take the form of a separation.18 Still, this punishment threat has to be credible.
Assume that a player did not act as intended and is supposed to be punished
by a separation. If staying together is in the interest of both in the following
period, the punishment will be postponed until a su¢ ciently high draw of one
of the outside utilities is realized.19 Furthermore, a separation only e⁄ectively
penalizes a player if it does not occur in equilibrium anyway. Thus, transfers
to reward cooperation can be enforced more easily if separation is less likely
in equilibrium and if the probability that ￿absent transfers ￿one partner will
want to break up is higher.
However, these factors might o⁄set each other to some extent. As an ex-
ample, take 2￿ s divorce costs k2. It is intuitive and will be shown below that
higher divorce costs generally make divorce less likely. But they also increase
the probability that the second earner is willing to stay within the marriage
17For example, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1989).
18In the household Nash bargaining literature discussed in the Introduction, considerable
discussion has taken place over whether separation is too drastic a punishment for failure
to disagree, and this has led to models which take as threat points non-cooperative Nash
equilibria within an ongoing household. It is said, for example, that one would not threaten
divorce over a failure to agree on the colour of a sofa. While we agree with that viewpoint, the
class of household decisions being analyzed in this paper is we believe su¢ ciently fundamental
that threats based on separation are the appropriate ones to assume.
19Formally, a player can always make sure of receiving her minmax-payo⁄. Furthermore,
note that as reneging triggers the end of all cooperation, it does not matter whose outside
utility is su¢ ciently high.
10anyway and does not need compensation. Therefore, it is not clear whether
higher divorce costs k2 have a positive or negative impact on the enforceability
of transfers.
A broken promise however can also have an impact on the general quality
of living together. Thus we assume that after a player reneges, the partner￿ s
outside utility increases by ￿vi in every period in each state. The size of ￿vi
has no qualitative impact on our results, unless it is so large that a punishment
is always credible and divorce occurs immediately after a deviation. Both cases
will be analyzed below.
To summarize: a spouse who wants to reward her partner for cooperation
has to make a payment now, but is punished in the future for not doing so.
Thus, ine¢ ciency can still exist in equilibrium, if either a punishment cannot
be enforced immediately after a deviation or if the future is su¢ ciently heavily
discounted.
While having children is a ￿discrete￿event in time, the same is not neces-
sarily true for making transfers and inducing a breakup. The period between
which payments are feasible could be made arbitrarily small,20 and there are
good reasons why an arti￿cial division into ￿xed periods would not re￿ ect the
real life of a couple. Thus, the main part of our paper will impose the as-
sumption that the decision whether to separate or remain together is always
made e¢ ciently in equilibrium. In the Appendix, we show that we approach
this outcome arbitrarily closely by assuming that time is continuous and each
period of a given (discrete) length can be divided into subperiods. If transfers
can be made and a separation induced in each of these subperiods,21 making
the latter arbitrarily small lets the couple separate almost only when this is
actually e¢ cient. The reason is that reneging is almost immediately followed
by a punishment. Subsequently, we take the initially assumed discrete nature
of the game literally and show what happens if ine¢ cient breakups can happen
on the equilibrium path.22
Before going on with the formal analysis, we should brie￿ y discuss whether
a separation really is always necessary to punish a devation from cooperative
behavior, as it destroys surplus (o⁄ equilibrium) and thus is not renegotiation
proof. Although this issue is not relevant within the limited horizon of our
model - where a deviation and thus punishment nevers occurs in equilibrium -
we want to point out that it is possible to construct an o⁄-equilibrium outcome
that actually is renegotiation proof. Instead of breaking up after a deviation, the
couple can continue to play a cooperative equilibrium, but where the reneging
player is subsequently pushed down to their reservation utility. This is possible
because of one important feature of relational contracts, namely that any sur-
plus distribution can be induced as long as both players at least receive their
reservation utilities. However, both approaches give the same equilibrium out-
20Wickelgren (2007), among others, makes this argument.
21Still, the interval between new draws of outside utilities remain ￿xed.
22However, the inability to commit to a necessary transfer might not be the only reason
why an ine¢ cient divorce can occur. Voena (2011), for example, assumes that one spouse￿ s
intertemporal budget constraint could bind.
11comes, and our focus on a non-renegotiation-proof equilibrium is without loss
of generalitiy.
In the following, we derive necessary (and su¢ cient) conditions to induce
allocations that increase e¢ ciency. These results do not depend on how the
resulting surplus is shared among players. Assuming a transfer to maintain the
relationship can be enforced, actually any surplus distribution is feasible - as
long as both players at least receive their reservation utilities. Thus, our ￿rst
objective is to characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria that are Pareto
e¢ cient and maximize the sum of players￿utilities.
4 Constraints in t = 0
In this section, we derive a general condition that speci￿es to what extent utility
transfers in period t = 0 are enforceable. If it binds, this condition determines
equilibrium fertility. If it does not bind, the e¢ cient fertility level can be at-
tained. Note that all results derived here hold independently of whether we
assume that the separation decision is always made e¢ ciently or not.
It will further become clear that only the (promised) allocation of utility
streams matters for players￿willingness to cooperate, and using an explicit for-
mulation in terms of the transfer p0 is just a useful tool to obtain that objective.
This also implies that players are indi⁄erent between receiving/giving current
resources (via p0) or expected future payo⁄s as a reward for cooperative behav-
ior - both can be substituted arbitrarily, and we do not have to speci￿y how
exactly resources are redistributed.
We start with the de￿nition of the relevant payo⁄ streams. De￿ne ￿ U￿
i as
i￿ s expected discounted continuation utility on the equilibrium path at t = 1
taking into account both non-divorce and divorce states.23 Then de￿ne Ui as
i￿ s expected discounted continuation utility o⁄ the equilibrium path at t = 1:
Note that o⁄-equilibrium or reservation utilities Ui do not necessarily coin-
cide with expected separation utilities ~ Ui (de￿ned in (4) and (5) above) because
they might cover states where divorce does not occur. To what extent they
di⁄er depends on the credibility of punishment threats. Furthermore, we can
omit the time subscript without loss of generality.24
At the beginning of period t = 0, both spouses unanimously decide on
equilibrium fertility n￿ and an associated transfer p0, taking future utility allo-
cations into account (which might be a function of fertility as well).25 If they
fail to reach an agreement, they have n￿￿ = minfn￿￿
1 ;n￿￿
2 g children and play the
non-cooperative equilibrium from then on, where n￿￿
i is player i￿ s individually
preferred non-cooperative fertility level, i.e., if pt = 0 for all t ￿ 0.
Knowledge of n￿￿
i also tells us who needs to be compensated in equilibrium,
23Corresponding to the U
￿
i will be (possibly implicit) side payments p which in general also
vary across states.
24The reason is that current and future payo⁄s are perfect substitutes, and we can thus
focus on stationary contracts.
25For a formal description see section 2.1 above.
12namely the one with a lower level. To ￿x ideas we will generally assume that
n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 .26 Then, the players can (possibly tacitly) agree on the following deal
at the beginning of period 0. Player 2 is willing to accept n￿ > n￿￿
2 . After the
children are born, she receives a transfer p0(n￿) at the end of period 0 and/or
the promise of higher continuation payo⁄s in the future. If she insists on any
smaller number of children, there will be no transfer in period t = 0 as well as
in any other subsequent period. If she insists on a smaller n, she will always
choose n￿￿.
The opposite is true for n￿￿
1 < n￿￿
2 . Then, the primary earner needs be com-
pensated for agreeing on a higher fertility level, either with the (now negative)
transfer p0(n￿) or a higher expected continuation utility.
Two kinds of conditions have to be satis￿ed so that n￿ can actually be
part of an equilibrium. First of all, given players believe the transfers will be
made, it has to be optimal for both to choose n￿ rather than any other level.
Furthermore, transfers have to be credible, i.e., making them has to give players
a higher utility than not making them.
Making n￿optimal for both players given that promised transfers are made
is captured by incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, which are
(IC1)
u11(n￿) ￿ p0(n￿) + ￿U
￿
1(n￿) ￿ u11(n￿￿) + ￿U
￿
1(n￿￿) (6)
for player 1, and
(IC2)
u21(n￿) + p0(n￿) + ￿U
￿
2(n￿) ￿ u21(n￿￿) + ￿U
￿
2(n￿￿) (7)
for the second player.
Here, ui1(n) is player i￿ s period-0 utility and U
￿
i(n￿) player i￿ s expected
discounted equilibrium payo⁄stream in period 1. Which case actually holds de-
termines whether transfers are negative or positive: n￿￿
1 > (<) n￿￿
2 ) p0(n￿) >
(<)0.27
Furthermore, it has to be in the interest of players to make a promised
transfer. This is only the case if their utility is higher than otherwise. Thus,
reneging requires a punishment. As discussed above, this punishment takes the
form of pushing a player down to her reservation utility. The following dynamic
enforcement (DE) constraints make these arguments precise. If a transfer is
positive, the primary earner has to decide whether to make it or renege. He will




1(n￿) ￿ U1(n￿)] (8)
26We could support this with the argument that the introduction of the contraceptive pill
gave women control over their own fertility and was associated with a signi￿cant fertility
decline.
27If continuation utilities alone give su¢ cient incentives for ￿rst-best equilibrium fertility, it
would even be possible that we observe n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 and a negative transfer. However, p0(n￿)
then is being used solely used for redistributive purposes in period t = 0 and not to give
incentives. We are not interested in this possibility, as it would imply that constraints in
period t = 0 do not bind in equilibrium and thus are not relevant.
13is satis￿ed. If the payment is supposed to be negative, the secondary earner
makes the relevant decision. She will only cooperate if her utility after making




2(n￿) ￿ U2(n￿)] (9)
Note that the (DE) constraints require players to believe that future equi-
librium transfers are also made.
Combining (IC) and (DE) constraints then gives just one constraint which is





2 a fertility level n￿ can be enforced if and only if it satis￿es the
(IC-DC) constraint condition













2 , the necessary and su¢ cient condition for equilibrium fertility
n￿ is











The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix28.
The (IC-DE) constraint states that the gains from deviating today must not
exceed the future surplus, i.e., equilibrium payo⁄s net of reservation utilities.
The chosen fertility level has a direct impact on the enforceability of trans-
fers, a feature usually not observed in relational contracting models, where the
production process tends to be independent across periods. This aspect of
the problem becomes especially important when ine¢ cient separation occurs
in equilibrium, and higher fertility can help to increase relationship stability.
Furthermore, although the kind of production process usually used in the liter-
ature is independent over time, it still remains identical. This implies a further
dimension in which our setting di⁄ers, since incentives to increase fertility are
provided by using the surplus from remaining together.
The fact that satisfying the (IC-DE) constraint is also su¢ cient for enforcing
a fertility level n￿ (Proposition 1) allows us to separate surplus distribution from
incentive giving. This implies that any surplus distribution that gives players at
least their reservation utilities is enforceable. Thus, we can con￿ne our interest
28All proofs not presented in the text of the paper are contained in an Appendix which is
available electronically from the authors on request
14to the (constrained) Pareto optimal equilibrium, without having to worry about
who gets what.
Denoting players￿expected payo⁄s at the beginning of period t = 0 but after
the marriage decision has been made Ui, equilibrium fertility n￿ solves
max
n U = U1 + U2 (12)
subject to (IC-DE).
Depending on the realizations of outside utilities, the couple might break up
in equilibrium. Thus, the enforceability of transfers crucially depends on the
perceived relationship stability. If partners strongly believe that they will end
up getting separated anyway, they are less willing to ￿nd ways to cooperate
early on in the relationship. In the following, we therefore further analyze the
determinants of relationship stability on and o⁄ the equilibrium path.
5 E¢ cient Separation
In this section, we derive conditions for the case in which breaking up is optimal
for the couple. As already pointed out, we also assume at ￿rst that a separation
in equilibrium only occurs if it is e¢ cient (i.e., what the partners would choose if
they were able to fully commit) and then allow for ine¢ cient separations later.
This assumption somewhat neglects the discreteness of the model. As we will
see later, taking the discreteness seriously will always induce situations where
remaining together is e¢ cient but not possible, as the necessary transfer cannot
be enforced. Yet, it is not obvious why it should not be possible to make the
separation decision - as well as corresponding transfers - at any point in time.
In Appendix II, we show that if time is continuous and each original period is
subdivided into su¢ ciently small subperiods, we can get arbitrarily close to the
outcome that the couple breaks up if and only if that is actually e¢ cient. Thus,
even when this assumption is imposed, players still act within the framework of
a relational contract and not within a bargaining game.
If a bargaining structure such as that in MacLeod and Malcomson (1995)
or Shaked and Sutton (1984) were imposed, the surplus distribution on and o⁄
equilibrium would be the same, as would be the decision whether to remain
together or break up. Then, no punishment would be feasible, making it im-
possible to enforce a transfer. However, as the game continues with positive
probability after a transfer has been made and since trust in the partner￿ s on-
going willingness to cooperate is necessary to sustain cooperation at any point
in time, remaining within the relational contracts framework even with the as-
sumption regarding e¢ cient separations seems sensible. This implies two further
issues. If all trust between the players is lost after one reneged, the couple will
break up o⁄ equilibrium even if remaining together would be optimal. Further-
more, any surplus distribution is feasible.29
29Again, this would allow us to obtain an outcome that is renegotiation proof - even o⁄
155.1 Some Implications
Take periods t ￿ 1 (the ￿rst time a break-up can occur is t = 1) and assume
that the couple has married.30 De￿ne
u0
1 = w1 + ’1(n) (13)
u0
2 = w2(n) + ’2(n) (14)
as the per-period utilities the partners would have within the relationship with
pt = 0 for t ￿ 1, and U0
i as the respective in￿nite discounted payo⁄ streams




~ Ui) < 0, a separation is optimal and will occur.
As all utility components are ￿xed and constant over time except for the
realizations of ~ vi, the latter determine whether the couple should break up.
More precisely, this is speci￿ed by the sum of outside utility realizations, v1+v2,
independent of the respective individual values. Thus, de￿ne
~ v ￿ ~ v1 + ~ v2 (15)
where ~ v has distribution F(~ v) and continous density f(~ v) (speci￿ed below)





Lemma 1: Assume the separation decision is made e¢ ciently. Then, a
divorce takes place if and only if ~ v > ^ v, where ^ v is de￿ned by





f(~ v)(^ v ￿ ~ v)d~ v ￿ ^ v = 0 (16)
Proof :




~ Ui) < 0 is the ￿rst component needed to establish the existence of the threshold
^ v. In addition, we need that, given that the threshold setting
P2
i=1(U0




i ￿ ~ Ui) is decreasing in ^ v.
Finding a value ^ v that satis￿es
P2
i=1(U0
i ￿ ~ Ui) = 0 is done recursively. First,
we assume this threshold exists and that a divorce takes place if and only if
v > ^ v for any value of ^ v. Then, we derive the conditions for this behavior actu-
ally to be optimal, i.e., specify ^ v.
equilibrium, the separation decision could be made e¢ ciently, yet pushing the player who
deviated down to his/her reservation utility.
30The issue of marriage versus cohabitation is considered in section 8 below.
16Given the threshold ^ v, the partners￿ expected discounted payo⁄ streams
within the relationship when pt = 0 for an arbitrary period t ￿ 1 (which also
allows us to omit time subscripts) are
U0
1 = w1 + ’1(n) + ￿
h
F(^ v)U0




2 = w2(n) + ’2(n) + ￿
h
F(^ v)U0
2 + (1 ￿ F(^ v))E[~ U2 j v ￿ ^ v]
i
(18)
















where we take into account the assumption that once a couple breaks up, it will
not get together again in the future. To obtain a characterization of E[~ Ui j v ￿
^ v], the realizations of vi in ~ Ui(vi) only have to be replaced by E[vi j v ￿ ^ v].
Note that (as v1 and v2 are independently distributed)






















































E[v1 j v ￿ ^ v] =
1




















17E[v2 j v ￿ ^ v] =
1








































Plugging all expressions into U0
1 + U0
2 = ~ U1(v1) + ~ U2(v2), applying Bayes￿
rule and rearranging gives (16).
Finally, it remains to show that (16) is decreasing in ^ v. Di⁄erentiating (16)
with respect to ^ v gives ￿(1 ￿ ￿F(^ v)) < 0, which completes the proof.
Note that this proof does not require ^ v ￿ v1
1 + v1
2, i.e., that the threshold
is below the upper bound of the support of ~ v. Thus, we also cover the case in
which divorce never occurs in equilibrium.
It is then easy to prove
Proposition 2: Given that the separation decision is e¢ cient, divorce in a
period is less likely - for given distributions of outside options - the higher are
divorce costs, the lower is the primary earner￿ s post-separation right of access to
the children, ￿, and the higher the number of children, while it is independent of
the wealth division parameter ￿; the wage gap w1 ￿w2 and the second earner￿ s
labour supply 1 ￿ g(n):






















(1 ￿ ￿F(^ v))
> 0
(26)
These results are perfectly intuitive. Wealth division simply represents a
transfer between the partners. Although it makes the primary earner less prone
to ￿le for a divorce, the opposite is true for the second earner, with a net e⁄ect
of zero. Loss of the primary earner￿ s access to the children on the other hand is
a form of deadweight loss to the couple, as are divorce costs. This suggests that
there is a tradeo⁄ from society￿ s point of view between the primary earner￿ s
post-divorce right of access to the children and the divorce rate, since increasing
the former also raises the latter, other things equal.
In the restricted context of the separation decision, higher fertility leads to
a lower divorce rate, since the deadweight loss from divorce increases with n;
18given ’0
1(n) > 0 and ￿ < 1: Since fertility is endogenous, however, there is still
much more to be said on the relationship between fertility and divorce.
Note that the results for ki are valid for couples married at the time when
the law changes. They do not imply that divorce rates have to go up in the long
run (if costs are reduced and ￿ increased). Instead, a new institutional setting
also changes incentives to actually become married, thus a⁄ecting subsequent
divorce propensities. We further explore this issue in section 8 below. We just
note here that short-run e⁄ects do indeed appear to di⁄er from long-run e⁄ects.
As an example, take the change to unilateral divorce laws in many US states
some decades ago, which could be regarded as a reduction of divorce costs. In
the short run, divorce rates went up, con￿rming our predictions; however, they
returned essentially to their initial levels after some time (see Wolfers, (2006),
Matouschek and Rasul, (2008)).
5.2 Who is more likely to initiate divorce?
There seems to be strong empirical evidence that in some countries at least, a
wife is signi￿cantly more likely than a husband to be the one to initiate divorce.31
One obvious possible explanation would be that husbands are more likely to
break their promises, but that is not consistent with our model, which predicts
no deviations along the equilibrium path. Given that we assume e¢ cient divorce,
our model would predict that the second earner would be the one to initiate




i ￿ ~ Ui) < 0 and U0
2 ￿ ~ U2 < 0 < U0
2 ￿ ~ U2 (27)
In that case the primary earner is the one who would like to keep the marriage
going, but he cannot make a su¢ ciently large transfer to induce the second
earner to agree. Using the earlier de￿nitions of these payo⁄s, it is straightfor-
ward to prove:
Proposition 3: Given that divorce takes place if and only if it is e¢ cient,
the second earner is more likely to initiate divorce than the primary earner on
the equilibrium path (cet. par.):
￿ the more favourable her distribution F2(^ v2) relative to his, F1(^ v1); in the
sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance
￿ the higher is ￿; the generosity of the wealth division rule toward the second
earner
￿ the larger is the gender wage gap w1 ￿ w2(n)
￿ the lower is her divorce cost k2 relative to k1
￿ the lower is ￿; the measure of post-divorce access to children for the pri-
mary earner
31See Guven et al (2009), who show this using data sets for the UK, Germany and Australia.
19￿ the higher is fertility n and the utility the primary earner derives from his
children, ’1(n)
6 Fertility
We now characterize equilibrium fertility and derive comparative statics results
with respect to a number of divorce laws. The aim is to contribute to the
public discussion on why fertility in (especially) Western countries has been
falling. As already pointed out, this discussion usually restricts attention to a
simple bene￿t-cost analysis and discusses the e⁄ectiveness of various policies to
reduce various costs (also including parents￿human capital losses). All these
issues could also be incorporated into our model, yielding the predicted results.32
Here, we take a di⁄erent approach and show that legislation that is not directly
aimed at in￿ uencing the propensity to have children might have a substantial
impact as well. Since costs and bene￿ts are at least partially exogenously given
and ￿xed (for reasons explained above), redistribution within the household is
needed to equalize the burden among spouses. However, no formal contract
determining within-household allocation can be written, and all transfers have
to be self-enforcing.
We assume that all cooperation ceases after a separation, and the implicit
agreement is replaced by formal rules.33 Di⁄erent divorce laws have an impact
on relationship stability and/or the absolute and relative welfare levels of spouses
after a separation. Thus, these rules will directly a⁄ect each partner￿ s utility as
well as the enforceability of transfers, by having an impact on the credibility of
punishment threats as well as the risk of being left alone. Note that the following
results are true for a couple given it chooses marriage. It does not necessarily
imply that divorce laws have the predicted consequences at the aggregate level.
Instead, couples might also adjust their marriage-versus-cohabitation decision.
We further explore this issue in section 8 below.
6.1 Equilibrium Fertility
Absent any transfers, individually optimal fertility levels n￿￿
1 and n￿￿
2 will gen-
erally di⁄er. To what extent the spouses￿interests can be aligned depends on
the enforceability of transfers.
Recall that the couple solves
max
n U = U1 + U2
subject to the (IC-DE) constraint derived above, where Ui are the expected
utility streams at the beginning of period t = 0, i.e., when the household has just
32For example, providing subsidized child-care facilities would reduce g(n) at each n and
thus increase fertility.
33We will further specify below how our setting relates to the general matter of interactions
between explicit and implicit contracts, as for example analyzed by Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy (1994).
20been formed. The objective in period 0 is set on lifetime utility streams, taking
into account the utilities that will actually be chosen in each state (including
divorce utilities in the corresponding states). The distributional variables are
those relevant in period 0, when the allocation is being chosen. The decision
must take into account the e⁄ect of the current fertility choice on all future
utilities along the equilibrium path.
If the (IC-DE) constraint does not bind, we obtain the e¢ cient outcome,
and equilibrium fertility is described by









1 ￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(^ v))￿
1 ￿ ￿F(^ v)
￿ 1 (29)
The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in the Appendix.
This leads to the conclusion that in the presence of a positive probability
of divorce (1 ￿ F(^ V2) > 0) and less than complete access to the children after
divorce for the primary earner (￿ < 1) there will be a lower fertility rate than
is socially optimal, since this would require ￿ = 1: The marginal social bene￿t
of fertility is (’0
1(n￿) + ’0
2(n￿))=1 ￿ ￿, and the marginal social cost (recall that
child consumption costs have been set to zero) is the marginal value of the time
the second earner spends in child rearing in both periods, taking into account
also the value in period 1 of the loss of human capital in period 0.
This immediately allows us to obtain some comparative statics predictions
with respect to divorce laws when the e¢ cient fertility level is feasible. It suf-
￿ces to discuss this for the case of n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 .
Proposition 5: Assume that n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 and the respective (IC-DE) con-
straint does not bind. Then, higher divorce costs increase equilibrium fertility,
a lower access of the primary earner to his children might or might not increase
fertility, while wealth division laws have no impact.
Proof:
Equilibrium fertility is characterized by (28). Note that the second order
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1(n)(1 ￿ ￿) +
￿(1 ￿ F(^ v))￿




@n2 7 0 (32)
As wealth division rules after a divorce only redistribute funds between
spouses, they cancel out when the constraint does not bind and thus have no
impact on equilibrium fertility.
Condition (28) in Proposition 4 gives some intuition on whether increasing
divorce costs or reducing ￿ could be expected to raise or lower fertility. Clearly
for ￿ = 1 we have ￿ = 1 and so fertility will be at its ￿rst best level, since the
probability of divorce no longer plays a role in determining fertility. However,
realistically we must have ￿ < 1 if a couple ceases to cohabit after divorce
and the children remain with the second earner.34 Then, higher divorce costs
always increase fertility by making divorce less likely. The probability of the
e¢ ciency loss induced by a separation is reduced, inducing the couple to have
more children. Thus, divorce costs serve as a commitment device, an outcome
supported empirically by Rasul (2005), Stevenson (2007), Matouschek and Rasul
(2008), and Bellido and MarcØn (2011).
The results of reducing ￿ are ambiguous because there are two opposing
e⁄ects. On the one hand, the marginal return to fertility across divorce states
goes down. However, the probability of no divorce increases, and the net e⁄ect
depends on parameter values and the form of the distribution function F(:): If
￿ is close to 1, the latter e⁄ect is negligible, and a reduction of a father￿ s access
to his children after a separation always leads to a fertility reduction.
Finally, note that reducing the marginal cost on the right hand side of (28)
would also increase fertility, and this could be achieved by reducing the rate
at which increased fertility reduces the second earner￿ s loss of human capital,
clearly strengthening the argument for policies that allow second earners to
combine raising a family with pursuing a career.
The question arises of whether higher divorce costs or a decrease in ￿ are
bene￿cial, especially when they increase fertility. Although low birth rates a⁄ect
a society as a whole (consider for example the discussions on the ￿nancing of
the welfare state), we restrict attention to the impact of divorce laws on the
utilities of the partners involved. Moreover, in the long run only the couple￿ s
welfare is relevant. If their utilities are lower in the presence of divorce laws,
they will simply abstain from getting married and instead cohabit (see section
8)
Then, as long as the (IC-DE) constraint is not binding, restrictions such as
higher costs or a decreased access to children after a divorce reduce total utility.
Lemma 3: Given the e¢ cient fertility level can be enforced, higher divorce
costs and a lower ￿ decrease total equilibrium surplus U.
34Even if there are no legal restriction to a primary earner￿ s access, the pure fact that the
parents no longer live together will reduce the time he can spend with his children.
22Proof:
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1 ￿ F(^ v)
1 ￿ ￿F(^ v)
> 0 (35)
The reason for this result is that although higher costs or a lower access re-
duce the probability of divorce, this destroys surplus as players cannot consume
outside utilities vi where it would otherwise be optimal (note that marriage sta-
bility has no value per se). Thus, although divorce costs and a lower value of ￿
serve as a commitment device to increase fertility, the increased commitment is
harmful if (IC-DE) does not bind.
6.2 A Binding (IC-DE) Constraint
If the relationship is relatively unstable or the di⁄erence between n￿￿
1 and n￿￿
2
large (for example because 2￿ s marginal human capital loss is high), it is likely
that the (IC-DE) constraint (10) binds and equilibrium fertility is smaller than
the e¢ cient level.
First, to see that equilibrium fertility is lower than the level implied by (28),








If (IC-DE) does not bind, ￿ = 0 and we are in the unconstrained case. If it binds,
d(IC ￿ DE)=dn has to be negative. The reason is that otherwise, increasing
fertility would relax the constraint, contradicting that we are at an optimum.
Thus, dU0=dn > 0 in an equilibrium with the (IC-DE) constraint binding. As
d2U0=dn2 must has to be negative as well, equilibrium fertility is lower when
(IC-DE) binds. Furthermore, it decreases with ￿.
Then, n￿ is determined by the binding constraint, or, in case of n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 ;











It is worth further specifying o⁄-equilibrium utilities U1(n￿) and U2(n￿￿).
Recall that after a player deviates, no further transfers are made. The couple
breaks up if inducing a divorce is optimal for at least one player, which depends
23on the realizations of the outside utilities. If these are not su¢ ciently high,
both just receive their relationship-utilities wi + ’i(n) in the respective period
and wait for the next draw of ~ vi. In addition, the partner￿ s failure to make an
agreed payment has a negative impact on the overall quality of the relationship
and thus increases the partner￿ s outside utility by ￿vi ￿ 0 in every subsequent
period. This has an impact on the couple￿ s ability to redistribute resources, but
only as it a⁄ects the likelihood of a separation o⁄ equilibrium.
In the Appendix we derive thresholds v￿
i and v￿￿
i (depending on who devi-
ated) for individual outside utilities. Only if either one of these thresholds is
exceeded does a separation occur in the respective period. Otherwise, if both
realizations of outside utilities are below these thresholds, both players prefer
to stay together for at least one more period even though the partnership is
no longer really working properly.35 Then, they just wait until at least one
partner￿ s outside utility is su¢ ciently high as to end the relationship.
The actual levels of ￿vi have no qualitative impact on comparative statics
results unless they are so high that both thresholds are below the lower bound
of the support of outside utilities, i.e., if v￿
i =v￿￿
i ￿ v0
i . Then, a deviation is
immediately followed by a separation in any case. This changes the impact of
divorce laws on fertility if (IC-DE) binds, as increasing marriage stability then
does not make a divorce threat less credible, and thus has an unambiguously
positive e⁄ect. Therefore, we treat the cases where the ￿vi are high enough as
to always induce a punishment, and that in which they are not, separately, still
focusing on the situation with n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 .
In the ￿rst case, we have
Proposition 6 : Assume n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 , the (IC-DE) constraint binds and both
values of ￿vi are su¢ ciently high that any deviation is immediately followed by
a separation for all realizations of ~ vi. Then, (cet. par.)
￿ higher divorce costs
￿ higher alimony payments






i , we have Ui = ~ Ui. Plugging all values into the binding
(IC-DE) constraint gives
(IC-DE)




(w2(n￿) + ’2(n￿) ￿ w2(n￿￿) ￿ ’2(n￿￿))
35This gives a kind of counterpart in this model to the "non-cooperative equilibrium within







f(~ v)(^ v ￿ ~ v)d~ v +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿(w2(n￿￿) ￿ w2(n￿)) ￿ 0 (37)
If this binds in equilibrium, @(IC￿DE)=@n < 0, since otherwise, higher fertility
would relax the constraint, contradicting that it binds and fertility is too low at

























As higher divorce costs reduce the likelihood of a divorce without decreasing
the severity of punishment, the range of states where surplus can be redistrib-
uted and used to provide incentives becomes larger. As empirically established,
divorce costs thus also serve as a commitment device when the (IC-DE) con-
straint binds.
Higher alimony payments partially compensate the secondary earner for her
human capital loss and thus reduce her marginal costs of having children. For
a given fertility level the di⁄erence between her on- and o⁄-equilibrium fertility
increases as w2(n￿￿) > w2(n￿). Thus, more redistribution between the spouses
can be enforced, allowing them to increase n￿. Note that the impact of higher
alimony is not driven by reducing 1￿ s reservation equilibrium utility, as this
cancels out against 2￿ s increased reservation utility. Although having no direct
impact on relationship stability, alimony payments thus make a separation less
likely in equilibrium, as the probability of a divorce decreases in equilibrium
fertility n￿.
A reduction of ￿ now has an unambiguosly positive impact on fertility. As
fertility is too low, the utility reduction in case of a separation as a factor
reducing fertility is obviously not taken into account. Thus, lower access of
the primary earner to his children increases fertility by relaxing the (IC-DE)
constraint.
As fertility is ine¢ ciently low when (IC-DE) binds, making divorce more
costly or di¢ cult to obtain can even increase the total relationship surplus.
This is always the case for alimony payments, which would have no impact on
the surplus if the e¢ cient fertility level were enforceable.
Lemma 4: Assume n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 , the (IC-DE) constraint binds and that both
values of ￿vi are su¢ ciently high that any deviation is immedialety followed by
a separation for all realizations of ~ vi. Then, higher divorce costs and a lower ￿
might or might not increase the relationship surplus. Higher alimony payments
25always increase the surplus
Proof :




















































1 ￿ F(^ v)
1 ￿ ￿F(^ v)
7 0
(42)
If a player￿ s deviation is not triggered by a su¢ ciently high increase of the




i ), the impact of divorce laws is less obvious. Now, they not
only a⁄ect divorce utilities but also the likelihood that punishment can actually
be carried out. Thus, we have





i . Then, the impact of
divorce laws on fertility is ambiguous.
The proof for Proposition 7 can be found in the Appendix.
The e⁄ects of higher divorce costs or a lower level of ￿ are ambiguous, as
these policies not only lower utilities in case of a divorce (which helps to enforce
transfers) but also make it less likely that a punishment is actually carried out,
because it becomes more attractive for players to remain within a marriage
even if partners no longer cooperate. Concerning wealth division rules, we
have as before increasing equilibrium fertility. Furthermore, 2￿ s willingness to
actually induce a divorce in each period o⁄￿ equilibrium increases, while the
primary earner is less likely to do that. Which e⁄ect dominates depends on the
distributions of outside utilities. If these are for example uniformly distributed
on the same support, both e⁄ects cancel out, and the impact of alimony on
fertility is unambiguously positive.
The e⁄ect of divorce laws on total e¢ ciency is also ambiguous, and we omit
a formal analysis. When they increase fertility, they might increase total surplus
for the same reason as above.
7 Ine¢ cient Separation
In the preceding section, we assumed that the separation decision is always made
e¢ ciently in equilibrium. We further show in Appendix II that this outcome
can be approximated arbitrarily closely in a continuous-time setting where the
period length between decisions diminishes. Now, we take a di⁄erent approach
26and take the discreteness of the game literally, although we do think assuming
an e¢ cient decision is more persuasive. For example, the fact that initiating a
divorce takes time does not play a role here. This does indeed create a time-lag,
namely between the decision to break up and the time from which the institu-
tional changes - costs, wealth division, and a reduced access - come into force.
However, this just requires us to discount the relevant parameters accordingly,
which will a⁄ect the threshold ^ v, but give the same qualitative results as before.
The main di⁄erence is that a separation can occur even if it is e¢ cient to
remain together. The reason is that not all necessary transfers are enforceable,
their enforceability only depends on expectations about future payo⁄s. Still, the
results are not too di⁄erent from those given above; the possibility of ine¢ cient
divorce is just always taken into account. Furthermore, fertility is a⁄ected, as
children do not just provide utility per se but can also have an impact on the
likelihood of a separation. If this likelihood is reduced, fertility can even be
above the e¢ cient level.
To start with the formal analysis, we briefy recall the timing within a period
t ￿ 1 :
￿ The realizations of players￿outside utilities ~ vi are revealed to both. Then,
they continue the relationship or break up. After a separation, players
immediately receive their reservation utilities ~ Ui(vi).
￿ If they remain together, they work and receive their wages. Then, the
transfer pt (also allowed to be negative) is made from 1 to 2.
￿ Finally, they consume the private consumption good xt and enjoy utility
from their children.
Furthermore, once the couple separates, it is assumed that the partners never
come together again. Note that the timing of the transfer is not important -
if it can already be made after outside utilities are revealed but before players
have to make the separation decision, no additional stability is created.
Thus the ~ vi are independently and identically distributed over time. Ob-
taining the states in which a separation occurs is slightly more involved now,
as there does not exist just one value for the outside utilities above which the
couple breaks up. Instead we have three thresholds, one for ~ v1, one for ~ v2 and
one for the sum ~ v. If any one of these thresholds is exceeded, a separation will
occur. The reason is that we not only have to worry about e¢ ciency, but also
about the enforceability of transfers to maintain the relationship. As the latter
only depends on expectations about future payo⁄s, thresholds for enforceability
and e¢ ciency generally will not coincide.
For concreteness, again assume that the couple chooses to marry. Recall the
de￿nitions u0
i = wi + ’i(n) as the per-period utilities within the relationship
with pt = 0 for any t ￿ 1. Then, player i must be compensated to be willing
to stay in the relationship if u0
i + ￿U
￿
i ￿ ~ Ui(vi) < 0, where U
￿
i is the expected
27equilibrium utility stream of player i (including transfers)36 and ~ Ui(~ vi) is player
i￿ s utility if ￿ling for divorce in the respective period. Any transfer p(vi) must
make it optimal for both players to stay within the relationship. Furthermore,
it has to be in the interest of player 1 to provide a positive payment and for 2
to provide a negative payment. Concerning o⁄-equilibrium payo⁄s, we assume
for concreteness that if any player does not keep a promise, the increase in
the other￿ s outside utility, i.e., ￿vi, is large enough to immediately induce a
subsequent divorce.




0, i.e., the secondary earner needs a transfer to remain within the relationship.
This transfer, denoted p(v2), must be large enough to satisfy 2￿ s individual
rationality (IR) constraint
u0
2 + p(v2) + ￿U
￿
2 ￿ ~ U2(v2) ￿ 0 (43)
Furthermore, 1￿ s (IR) constraint must hold, which is obviously the case if
breaking up would be ine¢ cient, i.e., if v1 + v2 ￿ ^ v.37 If this is the case, the
primary earner must actually be willing to make the transfer p(v2). This is
captured by 1￿ s dynamic enforcement (DE) constraint,
p(v2) ￿ ￿[U
￿
1 ￿ U1] (44)
Obviously, the right hand side of (44) is independent of current realizations
of outside utilities. Thus, the maximum feasible value of p(v2) is the same in
each period. Denoting this maximum feasible transfer by maxp ￿ ￿[U
￿
1￿U1], a




2 ￿ ~ U2(v2) ￿ 0. Whether it is actually made also depends on
1￿ s (IR) constraint, i.e., whether v1 is su¢ ciently small that v ￿ ^ v.
Concluding the previous arguments, a transfer that keeps 2 in the relation-
ship and satis￿es 1￿ s (DE) constraint exists if v2 ￿ vmax






2 ￿ ~ U2(vmax
2 ) + ￿[U
￿
1 ￿ U1] = 0
Equivalent considerations help us to de￿ne the threshold vmax
1 , stating when
a negative transfer exists that keeps player 1 within the relationship and satis￿es





1 ￿ ~ U1(vmax
2 ) + ￿[U
￿
2 ￿ U2] = 0
Therefore, a separation can never be prevented if either v1 > vmax
1 or v2 > vmax
2 .
As already pointed out, this does not imply that if v1 ￿ vmax
1 and v2 ￿ vmax
2
36Note that we omit a time subscript and thus do not allow expected equilibrium payo⁄s to
change over time. This is just done for convenience and without loss of generality, as - as we
will see when computing the relevant constraints - the enforceability of any transfer as well
as the e¢ ciency of a separation always depends on the sum of players￿utilities in equilibrium
and not on the surplus distribution.
37Note that ^ v here does not coincide with its value above, as separation probabilities will be
di⁄erent. Just the meaning is identical, namely that in a given period a separation is e¢ cient
if v > ^ v.
28are satis￿ed, the couple remains together. It still has to be in the interest
of a player to make a transfer. More precisely, the other￿ s (IR) constraint
must be satis￿ed as well, which will be the case if staying together is e¢ cient.
Concluding, a couple will not break up in any period t, if at the same time
v1 ￿ vmax
1 , v2 ￿ vmax
2 and v1 + v2 = v ￿ ^ v, where ^ v is characterized by all






1 = ~ U1(v1) + ~ U2(v2).
In any period, the likelihood of remaining together therefore is Pr(~ v1 ￿
vmax
1 \ ~ v2 ￿ vmax
2 \v ￿ ^ v). In the Appendix, we give an explicit formulation of
this probability and also prove
Proposition 8: The divorce probability is higher than when this decision is
made e¢ ciently
The proof of Proposition 8 can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 8 is very intuitive. Because a transfer necessary to maintain a
relationship might not be enforceable, the couple can also break up in states
where this is not e¢ cient. What we also show in the proof to proposition 8 is
that the divorce probability is strictly lower (unless ki = ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) = 0) than
in the case of e¢ cient divorce, i.e., that vmax
1 ￿ ^ v and vmax
2 ￿ ^ v cannot both
be satis￿ed.
In the following proposition, we state the impact of divorce laws and fertility
on marriage stability.
Proposition 9: The probality of a divorce decreases with higher divorce
costs and a lower value of ￿. The impact of alimony payments and more chil-
dren on marriage stability is ambiguous.
The proof of Proposition 9 can be found in the Appendix.
As before, divorce becomes more likely for lower divorce costs and a higher ￿.
They increase the e¢ cient threshold ^ v but also make transfers to maintain the
relationship easier to enforce (recall that we focus on the case with su¢ ciently
high ￿vi). Higher alimony payments can have a positive or negative impact
on marriage stability. On the one hand, they make it more di¢ cult to enforce
a positive transfer, as the secondary earner already gets alimony in the period
of divorce, while the primary earner only takes the future into account when
considering whether to make the transfer. The opposite is true for negative
payments. Which e⁄ect dominates depends on the exact speci￿cations of the
distribution functions of players￿outside utilities. More children, on the one
hand, make a marriage more stable by reducing utility after a separation if
￿ < 1. Still, children also a⁄ect stability via alimony payments. Thus, if those
make a divorce more likely (recall that their impact on stability is ambiguous),
the total e⁄ect of a higher fertility level on stability might be negative. Yet,
the net impact of alimony payments on stability should not be too high as it
29consists of two countervailing e⁄ects which might cancel out depending on the
Fi(:) distributions. Thus, it seems more convincing that children generally have
a positive impact on relationship stability, by increasing the gap between the
primary earner￿ s utility within and outside the relationship.
Some characterstics of equilibrium fertility are given in
Proposition 10: Assume the respective (IC-DE) constraint does not bind.
If the impact of children on marriage stability is positive, equilibrium fertility
might be higher than under full commitment. Otherwise it is lower. The impact
of divorce laws on equilibrium fertility is ambiguous.
The proof of Proposition 10 can be found in the Appendix.
Two issues are di⁄erent compared to before, when the divorce decision was
always made e¢ ciently. As the marriage is less stable, the couple￿ s propensity
to have children is lower, because the likelihood of the utility loss induced by
￿ < 1 is higher. Yet, if more children increase marriage stability, a countervailing
e⁄ect exists, and each of them can dominate. In addition to providing utility,
children might thus be ￿used￿as a commitment device that makes a separation
less likely.
Concerning comparative statics, higher divorce costs and a lower value of ￿
still might increase fertility by increasing relationship stability. Yet, if children
also make a separation less likely, some substitution between these two instru-
ments takes place. As the commitment role of children is less necessary, due to
a higher ki and lower ￿, a countervailing e⁄ect decreasing fertility exists, and it
is not clear which one dominates.
When the constraint binds, the situation changes, and the impact of a change
in costs and ￿ again becomes unambiguous.
Proposition 11: Assume n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 and that the respective (IC-DE) con-
straint binds. Then, higher divorce costs and a lower level of ￿ increase equilib-
rium fertility. The impact of alimony payments is ambiguous.
The proof of Proposition 11 can be found in the Appendix.
As fertility is too low anyway, potential substitution e⁄ects between fer-
tility and higher costs and a lower access play no role. Thus, these forms of
increased regulation unambiguously increase fertility as they increase maximum
enforceable transfers by reducing o⁄ equilibrium utilities. Higher alimony pay-
ments have a positive impact on fertility if their e⁄ect on marriage stability is
not too large. Then, a higher ￿ increases the secondary earner￿ s compensation
for her human capital loss in divorce states, induced by the wage di⁄erence
w(n￿￿) ￿ w(n￿).
308 Marriage Versus Cohabitation
Until now, the major part of our analysis, especially when considering the im-
pact of divorce laws, assumed that the couple marries. In this section, we explore
conditions for the optimality of marriage as opposed to cohabitation. If there
are no divorce costs ki = 0; then the model implies that the couple will choose
marriage if, following divorce, the regulation of the wealth division/alimony,
summarized by ￿; and of the primary earner￿ s child access, ￿; increases their
utilities ex ante, relative to what they expect them to be if they cohabit. To
￿x ideas, we assume ￿rstly that it is su¢ cient that the sum of utilities is higher
under marriage, i.e., we do not have to focus on individual utility levels, and sec-
ondly that child access under divorce and cohabitation will be the same. This
latter is a strong assumption, since in many countries the rights of access of
a previously cohabiting partner to his children post-separation may be legally
unde￿ned, thus introducing an important degree of uncertainty into the cohabi-
tation relationship. This would be an important subject for further work, in the
present paper it implies that the analysis is biased in favour of the cohabitation
decision.
If the separation decision is always made e¢ ciently in equilibrium, we can
state a ￿rst rather strong result, namely that a marriage will not take place if
the (IC-DE) constraint does not bind under cohabitation.
Proposition 12: Assume the separation decision is always made e¢ ciently
in equilibrium and that the relevant (IC-DE) does not bind for m = 0. Then,
the couple will not marry if ki > 0, i = 1;2. The spouses are indi⁄erent if
ki = 0 and ￿ ￿ 0.
Proof : Follows from Lemma 2, which states that U is monotonically de-
creasing in k and independent of ￿ if (IC-DE) does not bind.
Since fertility is at its e¢ cient level, divorce costs are not needed as a com-
mitment device. Furthermore, they decrease utility in case of a divorce and
unnecessarily increase relationship stability. This can change if the separation
decision is not always made e¢ ciently and if the associated e¢ ciency loss is
su¢ ciently large. We do not further explore the case of ine¢ cient separation in
this section, but simply note that in that case the increased relationship stability
induced by a marriage can be bene￿cial.
Thus, marriage can only be a useful institution in our setting if under co-
habitation, fertility is too low because of commitment problems. Of course, the
present analysis only captures a limited part of potential bene￿ts of a marriage.
For some couples, marriage might have a value per se,38 and young adults may
still face more or less pressure, arising out of social norms and attitudes, to get
married rather than cohabit in some societies. Furthermore, the tax system
38Which could be captured in our model by assuming di⁄erent distributions of outside
utilities for spouses that are cohabiting and those that are married.
31can favour marriage, especially if joint instead of individual taxation is applied.
Finally, relationship stability can have a value per se. Compensation for ongo-
ing household production might have to be self enforcing, and higher stability
increases the scope for cooperation. Also the welfare of children - which is left
aside in the current analysis - might be negatively a⁄ected by a separation.39
This result points to the importance of post-separation child access arrange-
ments if these were to di⁄er in favour of marriage.
In our setting, the institutional framework a marriage provides can only be
bene￿cial if the (IC-DE) constraint binds for a cohabiting couple. To simplify
the analysis, we now focus on the case where ￿vi, i.e., the increase in outside
utilities after a partner reneges is su¢ ciently high for a divorce to occur im-
mediately after someone deviates.40 Then, if divorce costs are negligible and a
wealth division rule ￿ > 0 is in place, a marriage will always be optimal if the




Proposition 13: Assume the separation decision is always made e¢ ciently
in equilibrium, that n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 , and that (IC-DE) binds under cohabitation.
Then, the couple will marry if ki = 0, i = 1;2 and ￿ > 0. If ki > 0, the couple
might or might not get married
Proof : Follows from Lemma 3, which establishes dU(n￿)=d￿ > 0 for n￿￿
1 >
n￿￿
2 and a binding (IC-DE) constraint. Furthermore, Lemma 3 establishes that
dU(n￿)=dki = (@U(n￿)=dn)(@n￿=@ki) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(^ v)) 7 0 .
A generous wealth division rule combined with laws making a divorce very
easy will thus induce the couple to marry, since ￿ increases the enforceability
of transfers without having a negative impact on e¢ ciency. However, we have
to recognise that we only consider the impact of divorce laws on the sum of
payo⁄s. If an ex-ante redistribution is not feasible, things might be di⁄erent.
Despite an ine¢ ciently low fertility level, it can then be in the interest of the
primary earner to abstain from a marriage.
To our knowledge, the impact of wealth division rules on marriage rates has
received only limited attention in the empirical literature. One exception is
Rasul (2003), who ￿nds a negative e⁄ect on marriage rates of a change to an
equal division of property after a divorce. However, his results have to be treated
with care when comparing them to our analysis. Table 14 of his paper shows
that the explained negative impact is strongly and signi￿cantly negative only
for spouses contemplating a second marriage. For those not previously married,
39However, if spouses care about their children￿ s welfare, they will take the negative impact
of a separation into account and should not need the commitment induced by divorce costs.
40If this is not the case, potential bene￿ts of divorce costs and thus a marriage are even
lower, since they increase marriage stability not only in but also o⁄ equilibrium.
41To be fully precise, we would have to take into account the possibility that for example
under cohabitation, n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 , while n￿￿
1 < n￿￿
2 after a marriage. This could be induced by
substantial alimony payments, which increase the second earner￿ s bene￿ts from children in
case of a divorce. However, we restrict our attention to the case where n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 , whether
the couple is cohabiting or married.
32the coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant at the 10% level, and positive for men and
negative for women. Since our prediction of a positive impact of an equitable
wealth division after divorce is only due to a subsequent increase of fertility
rates, his results might be driven by spouses who do not consider having any
more children. Thus, wealth division rules should be analyzed empirically in
more detail, especially in connection to fertility levels.
The impact of divorce costs on marriage rates has received more attention in
the empirical literature, mainly due to the replacement of consent with unilateral
divorce laws in many US states some decades ago, which is taken as implying
a reduction in divorce costs,42 However, the empirical results are ambiguous.
Whereas Rasul (2003) and Matouschek and Rasul (2008) observe a decline in
marriage rates, Alesina and Giuliano (2007) do not ￿nd this e⁄ect, but to the
contrary ￿nd that there is an increase. This supports our claim that the greater
degree of commitment induced by higher divorce costs is not automatically
preferred by couples, since divorce utilities are reduced as well as the option
to utilize relatively high realizations of outside utilities. Only if the utility loss
induced by the binding (IC-DE) constraint is su¢ ciently high can the existence
of divorce costs make marriage optimal. If divorce costs are relatively high,
their reduction might make more couples willing to use them as a commitment
device to increase fertility. Alesina and Guiliano￿ s (2007) results are perfectly in
line with this interpretation. In wedlock fertility basically remains una⁄ected by
the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, while out of wedlock fertility decreases
signi￿cantly and fertility rates for newly married couples go up.
In the remainder of the section, we consider conditions that actually make
the (IC-DE) constraint bind and thus increase a couple￿ s propensity to get
married when substantial divorce costs are present. For n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 and with
￿v1 su¢ ciently large, the (IC-DE) constraint for a cohabiting couple is









f(~ v)(^ v ￿ ~ v)d~ v ￿ 0
(45)





f(~ v)(^ v ￿ ~ v)d~ v ￿ ^ v = 0.
Note that the ￿rst line of the expression above is negative because n￿￿
1 > n￿￿
2 .
Furthermore, since n￿ ￿ n￿￿
2 it is decreasing in n￿.
Then, the (IC-DE) constraint is more likely to bind if more time is needed to
raise an additional child (g0(n) is steeper) and if more children imply a higher
human capital loss for the second earner (w2(n￿) is steeper). This will also make
it more likely that the desired transfer is larger, implied by a larger di⁄erence
42This is supported by the fact that divorce rates immediately went up after the introduction
of unilateral divorce, see Friedberg (1998) or Matouschek and Rasul (2008).
33between n￿￿
1 and n￿￿
2 . Furthermore, a lower relationship stability (captured by





f(~ v)(^ v ￿ ~ v)d~ v) decreases the value of the left hand side
of the condition for given values of n￿ and n￿￿.
Although the ￿rst components are exogenously given within our model, they
deserve some attention here. For example, g0(n) could be steeper if fewer child-
care facilities were available at reasonable costs. Thus, couples might be more
inclined to marry. This point is also important for the second aspect, a higher
human capital loss associated with children. There, recall our assumption that
the second earner alone is responsible for raising the couple￿ s children. As argued
above, it seems unlikely that the fact that women still assume major parts of the
responsibilities associated with having children is purely driven by an optimal
(in an economic sense) allocation of tasks, but could also be in￿ uenced by factors
outside our model, for example cultural norms and values.
If men were willing to substantially participate in child-rearing and if jobs
were su¢ ciently ￿ exible, i.e., if the couple were able to commit to any allocation
of g(n), it would be possible to obtain e¢ cient fertility without the need of
additional transfers. Thus, if the couple is closer to an optimal time allocation,
the (IC-DE) is less likely to bind. Therefore, couples with more traditional views
should be more likely to get married, a claim that is supported by empirical
evidence43.
9 Conclusion
Making precise the conditions under which cooperation within a relationship
can be enforced, this paper has shown how the institutional setting following
a separation can make it easier or more di¢ cult to allocate resources within a
household and thus compensate a partner for the human capital loss associated
with having children. However, our approach is only a ￿rst step in the analysis
of the (often unintended) consequences of legislative changes. Future research
could evolve along three lines.
Further empirical research is needed to test our predictions. Whereas the
impact of divorce laws on divorce rates, the propensity to marry and fertility
has been extensively tested ￿especially using the natural experiment of a switch
from consensual or no-fault to unilateral divorce ￿this still remains to be done
for wealth division rules and a reduced access of one partner to his children after
a separation.
Furthermore, our model is general enough to incorporate further laws that
are important for a marriage. The impact of di⁄erent forms of income taxation
￿for example joint versus individual taxation ￿could be analyzed. The model is
also precise enough to look at the question of consent versus unilateral divorce in
more depth. Of course, a unilateral divorce is very likely to be associated with
43Kaufmann (2004) for example ￿nds that men with egalitarian counterparts are more likely
to cohabit than those with more traditional views
34lower divorce costs, as shown by the large empirical literature that found an
immediate increase in divorce rates following its introduction. However, taking
this matter literally and noting that under a consent divorce regime, one partner
alone cannot easily induce a divorce, might allow us to explain some empirical
results that canot be explained by a change in commitment power alone.
For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2007) ￿nd that after the introduction of
unilateral divorce laws, fertility rates for newly married couples went up, while
out-of-wedlock fertility decreased. They claim that lower divorce costs induce
couples to enter marriage more readily, without however further elaborating on
this explanation. Our model also provides an explanation. A consent divorce
regime taken literally makes it much more di¢ cult to enforce payments between
spouses. The reason for this is that transfers are no longer needed to keep the
partner within a marriage, and allocations on and o⁄ the equilibrium path do
not di⁄er.44
The model setting itself can be extended, for example by taking children￿ s
welfare into account and by assuming risk-averse players. In the latter case,
it will be necessary to analyze wealth division laws separately, since saving
will become an important endogenous variable. In addition, these laws might
not only compensate the secondary earner for her human capital loss, but also
help to equalize income across states. Furthermore, relationship stability - a
reduction of uncertainty - might have a value per se. Then, laws reducing the
attractiveness of a divorce could be welfare enhancing in comparison to the
present setting, and the role of children as a device to increase stability (via the
access parameter ￿) would have to be reassessed.
In conclusion, we hope to have shown that an approach to the issues concern-
ing marriage, fertility and divorce based on the theory of relational contracts
can make a new and useful contribution to our understanding of the complex
interrelationships among these institutional features of a modern society.
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